Jurnal Politeknik Caltex Riau
http://jurnal.pcr.ac.id

The Influence of Good Corporate Governance on Company Value in Jakarta Islamic Index Companies

Vera Oktari[1], Nanda Fito Mela[2] dan Arumega Zarefar[3]

[1]Universitas Riau, email: vera.oktari@lecturer.unri.ac.id
[2]Universitas Riau, email: Nanda.fito.mela@gmail.com
[3]Universitas Riau, email: arumegazarefar.akt@gmail.com

Abstract

The goal of this study is to assess the effect of the Board of Commissioner, Independent Commissioner, and Audit Committee to company value. The population in this study was all companies in Jakarta Islamic Index as many as 30 companies. This study is using purposive sampling method, there are 15 companies that listed in Jakarta Islamic Index on 2012-2016 that meets the criteria of the sample. The data analyzed by using multiple regression. The study states that the Board of Commissioner does not have a significant influence on firm value. Independent Commissioner has a significant impact on the corporate value. Audit committee has a significant effect on firm value.

Keywords: *Board of Commissioner, Independent Commissioner, Audit Committee, Firm Value*

1. Introduction

The purpose of the establishment of a business entity, whether State-Owned Enterprises or Private-Owned Enterprises is to make a profit. Maximizing the value of the company is one of the company goals that must be achieved (Anggraini, 2012). Company value is the achievement completed by the company in a certain period or the results of activities conducted by the company during a certain period (Zarefar, 2009)

Efforts that can be made by the owner or shareholder to maximize the value of the company are to submit the management of the company to experts or professionals called managers (Muryati and Suardikha, 2014). Jensen (2001) in Siallagan and Machfoedz (2006) states that in order to maximize the company's value in the long run, managers are required to make decisions that take into account the interests of all stakeholders, so that managers will be assessed for performance based on their ability to achieve the expected goals. Meanwhile, according to Morris (1987) in Suranta and Machfoedz (2003) explains that the manipulation of firm value is assumed to aim to maximize the profit that can lead to agency costs. Furthermore, Siallagan and Mas'ud Machfoedz (2006) stated that one of the mechanisms expected to control agency costs is by implementing good corporate governance. The same view is put forward by Faqi et al. (2013), to solve the problem companies need to implement Good Corporate Governance (GCG).

The phenomenon of the lack of good corporate governance is the case of PT. Lippo, Tbk, In this case, the company performs financial manipulation with the detection of three audited financial statements. In fact, an auditor should, as well as the board of directors and

Dokumen diterima pada Kamis 25 Januari, 2018
Dipublikasikan pada Kamis 31 Mei, 2018

commissioners, be parties that are trusted by shareholders to perform a certain task, which should be based on good faith and prudence. This indicates that the auditor has neglected to do his job well. The disclosure of this case is a big loss for the company, which is marked by the decline in stock prices of the company, because the financial community is hesitant to join the company (Surya and Ivan, 2006).

Corporate Governance began to become an interesting topic in Indonesia in 1998 when Indonesia was in crisis. Many banks are bankrupt (liquidated) because their survival cannot be maintained. One of the causes of bankruptcy of the bank, among others, has not been applied the principles of Corporate Governance in the banking environment (Effendi, 2008: 84) in Muryati and Suardikha (2014). Therefore, the government including Bank Indonesia has made various efforts to promote the realization of Good Corporate Governance in the banking environment. In 2006 Bank Indonesia issued Bank Indonesia Regulation no. 8/4 / PBI / 2006 dated 30 January 2006 regarding the implementation of Good Corporate Governance for commercial banks.

According to Zarefar (2009) corporate governance is one of the most efficient ways in order to reduce the occurrence of conflict of interest and ensure the achievement of corporate goals. Corporate Governance is a system that regulates and controls companies that are expected to provide and increase the value of the company to shareholders. To implement good corporate governance (GCG) and is expected to increase company value in a company, Good Corporate Governance mechanism is required.

One of the mechanisms of Good Corporate Governance is the Board of Commissioners, where the board of commissioners is supported by the perspective of service and control functions that can be provided by the board, as these two functions are more likely to be given by the Board of Commissioners for the conditions of corporate governance structure in Indonesia. Service function states that the Board may provide consultation and advice to management (directors). The interview-based Lorsch and Maclver (1989) study found that the role of advisory dominates the activities of board members (Young et al., 2001 in Kusumawati 2005). With this emphasis on functionality, Dalton and Daily (1999) state that the role of expertise or counseling provided by board members is a quality service for management and companies that cannot be provided by the market. Members of the board of commissioners who have expertise in a particular field can also provide valuable advice in the preparation of strategy and organization of the company. The control function undertaken by the board of commissioners is derived from agency theory that represents a major internal mechanism for controlling opportunistic management behavior so as to help align the interests of shareholders and managers (Young et al., 2001 in Kusumawati, 2005).

Another Good Corporate Governance Mechanism is the Independent Commissioner's Presence, where independent commissioners can also be used to resolve agency conflicts because independent commissioners can communicate shareholders' goals to managers. With the increasing complexity and challenges of the company, the company's internal commissioners have many shortcomings not only because of the low degree of independence but are also driven by the limitations of the quality of individual internal commissioners. The existence of Independent Commissioners continues to be strengthened so that the results of its work remain high with the support of the Audit Committee (Syakhroza, 2004).

Audit Committee also an extension of the board of commissioners, and can assist the Board of Commissioners in carrying out its responsibilities by providing an overview of accounting issues and internal oversight systems and financial reporting systems. A free audit committee is having no business relationship with the company nor does it have a familial relationship with the board of directors or the Commissioner of the company. With such freedom the Audit Committee must be fair in making decisions, it is intended for all parties concerned and is expected to improve the performance of the company (Hendri, 2006). To oversight the financial statements, the audit committee also serves to oversee the internal control of the company. The presence of this supervision will ensure the achievement of the company's performance and be able to increase the value of the company (Chan and Li, 2008) in (Muryati and Suardika, 2014).

Some empirical studies have been conducted by researchers namely Rachmawati and Triatmoko (2007) examine the factors that affect the value of the company. The results of their research provide empirical evidence that the existence of the audit committee and the composition of the independent commissioner does not affect the value of the company. Kusumawati and Riyanto (2005) examine the factors of corporate governance and board structure on the market value of the firm. Their results show that the size of the board of commissioners and corporate governance has a positive effect on the market value of the company.

Rismawati, Yusuf and Asriani (2015) examines the Effect of Internal Audit on the Implementation of Good Corporate Governance at PT. FIF Palopo Branch. Their results conclude that the role of internal audit has a positive and significant impact on the implementation of good corporate governance. Similarly, Adestian research (2015) entitled Influence of Board of Commissioners, Board of Directors, Independent Board of Commissioners, Audit Committee and Corporate Size on Corporate Banking Performance Listed on IDX In 2012-2014, concluded the size of the Board of Commissioners affect the performance of the company; The Board of Commissioners does not affect the performance of the company; The Board of Directors has no effect on the performance of the Company; Audit Committee has no effect on company performance.

Muryati and Suardikha (2014) examine the effect of Corporate Governance on Corporate Value concludes that the independent audit committee influences the firm's value but with a negative direction. While Purwaningtyas and Pengestu (2010) examined the Influence Analysis of Good Corporate Governance Mechanism on Value Company concluded that the Independent Board of Commissioners and Audit Committee showed the results are not significant to the value of the company. Meanwhile, Wahyudi (2010) examines the Influence of Good Corporate Governance Disclosure, Board of Commissioner Size and Cross-Directorship Level of the Board of Corporate Values concludes that the size of the Board of Commissioners has a negative and insignificant effect on the value of the company.

From the above description, the researcher is interested to examine the effect of good corporate governance on corporate value with research variables of Board of Commissioner, Independent Commissioner, and Audit Committee at companies registered in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII) in 2012-2016.

2. THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES

2.1 Agency Theory

In agency theory it is explained that agency relationship is a contract between manager (agent) and investor (principal). The conflict of interest between the owner and the agent occurs because the possibility of the agent does not always do in accordance with the interests of the principal, thus triggering agency costs (Ujiyanto, et al, 2007). The agency theory assumption states that the separation between ownership and management of a company can lead to agency problems. The owner of the company will authorize the manager (manager) to take care of the running of the company such as managing funds and making other company decisions for and on behalf of the owner of the company. It is possible that managers do not act on behalf of the owner's interests, due to differences of interest (Hamdani, 2016).

In agency theory, share ownership is wholly owned by shareholders and managers (agents) are required to maximize the return rate of holders (Barle and Means, 1932, in Hamdani, 2016). Thus it can be concluded that the core of the agency relationship is the separation between ownership (on the side of the principal / investor) and the manager (on the part of the agent / manager). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) in the agency theory called principal is the shareholder and the agent is the management that manages the company (Zarefar, 2009).

This theory emphasizes the importance of the company owner (shareholder) hands over the management of the company to the professionals (agents) in running the business every day. The goal is for the owners of the company to get the maximum profit as possible with the cost efficiency and managed by professionals. In general, management objectives and shareholders are usually no different. Both aim to maximize profits and increase revenue growth and share price of the company. However, in certain situations there are also different interests, whose solutions are often more favorable to management (OECD, 1999).

Conflict of interest caused by the possibility that the agent does not always act in accordance with the interests of the principal can be minimized with a supervisory mechanism, Corporate Governance is expected to serve as a tool to convince various related parties (Zarefar, 2009). Good Corporate Governance Mechanism serves as a tool to discipline managers to comply with contracts that have been agreed, so that the existence of good governance mechanism based on the principles of Corporate Governance is expected to reduce agency problems in the company which can then improve the performance of the company (Hartono and Nugrahanti , 2014).

2.2 Company Value

The Company was established with the aim of increasing the value of the company through increasing wealth of owners or shareholders. The higher the value the company describes the more prosperous the owner. The value of the company will be reflected from its stock market price (Fama, 1978).

The main purpose of the company is to increase the value of the company through increasing the wealth of owners or shareholders (Brigham, 1996). To increase the value of the company by arranging the company's financial activities, called financial management. According to the concept of Corporate Governance will get the value of the company (value of the firm) is maximal if the functions and tasks of each perpetrator of a modern business organization can be separated, then the company will obtain maximum corporate value.

The importance of Corporate Governance is also emphasized by various academics with the ultimate goal that the application of the GCG concept in the company can provide the company's value in a sustainable manner and at the same time provide benefits for the interest of shareholders and related stakeholders.

2.3 Good Corporate Governance

The Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (FCGI) defines corporate governance as a set of rules that establishes relationships among stakeholders, managers, creditors, government, employees, and other internal and external stakeholders. From the definitions described above, it can be concluded that corporate governance is a set of rules run by interested parties to ensure that the activities and goals of the company are to meet the interests and welfare of the stakeholders, not merely achieve the goals of the company itself.

In the implementation there are some principles of good corporate governance that must be applied by the company. GCG principles according to the KNKCG (National Committee on Corporate Governance Policy) attached in the General Guidelines of Corporate Governance (FCGI 2001) include transparency, accountability, responsibility, independency, and equity and fairness.

2.4 Factors Affecting Corporate Value

2.4.1 Board of Commissioners

The Board of Commissioners plays a very important role in the company, especially in the implementation of Good Corporate Governance. The Board of Commissioners is the core of Corporate Governance assigned to ensure the implementation of corporate strategy, overseeing management in managing the company, and obliging the implementation of accountability. In principle, the Board of Commissioners is an oversight mechanism and mechanism to provide guidance and direction to corporate managers. Given the responsible management to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of the company, while the Board of Commissioners is responsible for overseeing management, the Board of Commissioners is a center of endurance and success of the company.

The relationship between the number of board members and the value of the firm is supported by the perspective of service and control functions that the board can provide. Since these two functions are more likely to be given by the board of commissioners for the condition of corporate governance structure in Indonesia, the hypothesis of this study is limited only to the number / size of the board of commissioners only. Kusumawati and Riyanto (2005) examine the factors of corporate governance and board structure on the market value of the firm. Their results show that the size of the board of commissioners and corporate governance has a positive effect on the market value of the company.

From the explanation, the proposed research hypothesis is:
H1: The Board of Commissioners positively affects the value of the company.

2.4.2 Independent Commissioners

Independent Commissioner is a representative of shareholders in a broad sense that is stakeholders, which usually comes from government agencies, communities, NGOs, or other organizations that are outside the company and do not have shares in the narrow sense of the company where he became a commissioner. The independence and plurality of the Council, can make the Board work better which can then increase the value of the company. The Beasley (1996) study examined the relationship between the proportion of the Board of Commissioners and the fraud with non-cheating companies.

Nuryanah's research (2004) found evidence that the composition of the Board of Commissioners had no significant effect on the value of the company. Siallagan and Machfoedz (2006) stated that the Board of Commissioners positively affects the value of the company. From the explanation the proposed hypothesis is:
H2: independent commissioner positively influences the firm's value.

2.4.3 Audit Committee

In order to improve oversight of the management of the company and the implementation of GCG Indonesia Stock Exchange in Regulation No.1-A requires the establishment of Audit Committee in public companies. Audit Committee should consist of individuals who are independent and not involved with the day-to-day tasks of the managing management of company, and have experience to perform monitoring functions effectively. One of the main reasons for this independence is to maintain objective integrity and perspective in the report and the preparation of recommendations proposed by the Audit Committee, as independent individuals tend to be more impartial and impartial and objective in dealing with a problem.

The number of members of the Audit Committee adjusted to the extent of organization and responsibility. But usually three to five members is an ideal amount. The Audit Committee is usually required to hold meetings three to four times a year to carry out its obligations and responsibilities regarding the financial reporting system (FCGI, 2001). The Freedom of the Audit Committee is an important factor for ensuring accountability of management to shareholders (Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999; Cadbury Committee, 1992 in Hendri, 2006).

Rita grace (2005) in Hendri (2006) finds that the Freedom Audit Committee influences achievement in decision making when facing disputes between management and external auditors. Hendri's research (2006) found that the Freedom Audit Committee had no effect on the performance of the company. Based on the explanation, the proposed research hypothesis is:
H3: audit committee has a positive effect on company value.

3. RESEARCH METHODS

3.1 Population and Sample

The population in this study is all companies classified into the Jakarta Islamic Index (JII) listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Sample used in this study as many as 75 companies. Sampling technique using purposive sampling method, determine with certain criterion. The data in this study are collected from the financial statements of JII companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period of 2012-2016 which can be seen in www.idx.co.id.

3.2 Measurement of Variables

Variable of firm value is measured by Price Book Value (PBV) in accordance with research conducted by Zarefar (2009). Board of Commissioners variables is the number of board of commissioners owned by the company (Kusumawati and Bambang 2005). Independent Commissioner Variable is calculated by percentage of Independent Commissioner amount to total number of commissioner that exist in composition of board of commissioner (Rachmawati and Triatmoko 2007). Audit Committee variables are calculated by the percentage of independent Audit Committee divided by the total number of Audit Committee (Hendri, 2006).

3.3 Data Analysis Method

Data analysis method in this research is quantitative data analysis method processed by Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) 17 computer program. Data analysis is using descriptive statistic, classical assumption test, and then hypothesis testing. Hypothesis testing is using multiple linear regression analysis. The multiple linear regression equation analysis which is built in this research is:

$$\mathbf{Y = \alpha + \beta 1X1 + \beta 2\ X2 + \beta 3\ X3 + e.} \qquad \mathbf{(1)}$$

Information:

Y: The value of the company
X1: Board of Commissioners
X2: Independent Commissioner
X3: Audit Committee
e: Error

4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION RESULT

4.1 Descriptive Statistics Analysis

Descriptive statistics can provide descriptive or description of data seen from the mean, standard deviation, variant, maximum, minimum, sum, range, kurtosis, and skewness (Ghozali, 2009). The results of statistical descriptive treatment of each variable in this study are as follows:

Table 1. Descriptive statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
PBV	75	-.29	15.52	5.8975	5.58784
DK	75	1.10	2.48	1.8321	.29325
KI	75	-1.94	-.18	-.8816	.29482
KA	75	1.10	1.95	1.2400	.23251
Valid N (listwise)	75				

Source: SPSS Output

Table 1 shown that value of company assessed by PBV has an average of 5.8975. Board of Commissioner's variables have an average of 1.8321 means the average sample company has 1.8321% size of the board of commissioners. Independent Commissioner's variables have an average of -0.8816 means the average sample company has -0.8816% independent commissioners of the entire board of commissioners. Audit committee variables have an average of 1.2400%, means the average sample company has 1.2400% audit committee.

4.2 Hypothesis Testing Results and Discussion

Hypothesis testing in this study was conducted by using multiple linear regression analysis technique. Researchers use α = 5% to assess the significance of the relationship between each variable studied. Regression analysis results are presented in the following table: Based on table 3 above it can be seen that Durbin Watson value is 1.080, which indicates that Durbin Watson's value in this research is between -2 and +2, so the regression model is free from autocorrelation.

Table 2. Hypothesis testing result

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	Beta	t	Ig.
	B	Std. Error			
Constant	.336	.756		912	365
DK	.768	.064	.198	.826	072
KI	5.944	.105	-.314	2.823	006
KA	8.534	.698	-.355	3.163	002

Dependent Variable: PBV
Source: SPSS Ouput

4.2.1 Influence of the Board of Commissioners on Corporate Value

From table 4 regression test above can be seen that the variables of the Board of Commissioners (DK) has t count <t table that is equal to 1.826 and significance value> α that is equal to 0.072. So it can be concluded that the BOC variable has no significant effect on the value of the company. Thus, hypothesis 1 in this research is rejected. This finding is inconsistent with the results of Siallagan and Machfoedz (2006) and Kusumawati and Bambang (2005) research and suggesting that the Board of Commissioners positively affects the value of the company. However, these findings strengthen the results of Nuryanah (2004) Research which found evidence that the composition of the Board of Commissioners has no significant effect on the value of the company. A possible explanation is due to the different impact of the BOC's Size on Corporate Values with respect to company performance and the difference in sample used. During this time the board of commissioners has two trends, the first role of the commissioner is too strong in the company and the two roles of the commissioner who is too weak in carrying out its supervisory functions. The first tendency occurs when the commissioner represents the majority shareholder. In this case the commissioner too often intervened the board of directors, being excessively suspicious of the directors. In contrast, the second tendency occurs when the directors of the position are so strong that the effectiveness of the commissioner becomes impeded because, the directors are very reluctant to divide authority.

4.2.2 Effect of Independent Commissioners on Corporate Value

From table 4 above regression test results can be seen that Independent Commissioner (KI) has t count <t table that is equal to -2,823 and significance value> α that is equal to 0,006. Where the result of data processing is obtained t count equal to -2.823 and t table (n-k-1 = 75-3-1 = 71,055) is 1,993 thus t cal <t table, this means first hypothesis accepted, meaning there is influence between independent commissioner with company value. The result of this study in line with the results of research Siallagan and Machfoedz (2006) stated that independent commissioners significantly influence the value of the company.

4.2.3 The influence of the Audit Committee on Corporate Values

From table 4 above regression test results can be seen that the variable Audit Committee (KA) has t count> t table that is -3.163 and the significance value <α that is equal to 0.002. Where the result of data processing is obtained t count of -3,163 and t table (n-k-1 = 75-3-1 = 71,055) is 1,993 thus t cal <t table, this means first hypothesis is accepted, it means there is influence between audit committee to company value. This research is in line with the research

of Muryati and Suardikha (2013) which examines the effect of Corporate Governance on Corporate Value and concludes that audit committee influences company value.

4.3 Significant Simultaneous Test (F Test)

Simultaneous Significance Test is used to find out how large independent variables (X1, X2 and X3) together affect the dependent variable (Y). Before comparing the value of F, we must determine the degree of trust (1-α) and degrees of freedom (n-(k + 1) in order to determine the critical value. The Alpha value used in this study is 0.05. Where the decision criteria used is if F count <F table then H0 accepted because it has no significant effect and if F count> F table then Ha accepted because there is significant influence. Alpha value used in this study was 0.05. From the table 5, it is known that F count of 5.397 with a significance value of 0.002 <0.05 which means Ha accepted and H0 rejected. This shows that the variable size of the board of commissioners, independent commissioners and audit committee together significantly affect the value of companies in companies listed in (JII) year 2012-2016.

Table 3. Simultaneous Hypothesis Testing Recapitulation (F test)

F	Sig.	Symbol	Alpha (α)	Explanation	Result
5.397	.002[b]	<	0,05	Significant	Ha Accepted H0 Rejected

Source: SPSS output

4.4 Results of Coefficient of Determination Test (R2)

Coefficient of Determination (R2) is a coefficient used to see how much independent variable (board of commissioners, independent commissioner and audit committee) can explain the dependent variable (firm value) as shown at table 6.

Table 4. Coefficient of Determination Test Result (R2)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.431[a]	.186	.151	5.14783	1.080

a. Predictors: (Constant), KA, DK, KI; b. Dependent Variable: PBV
Source: SPSS Output

5. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

5.1 Conclusions

The results of research on the research model and hypothesis testing proposed in this study resulted in several conclusions as follows:

1. Normality of this research data can be seen from Normal Probability Plot. Normal Probability The plot in this regression analysis model shows that the data is close to the diagonal line. The classical assumption test performed on the regression analysis model is obtained evidence that the regression model is free from multicollinearity, heterocedasticity, and autocorrelation problems.
2. The first hypothesis submission shows that the size of the Board of Commissioners has no effect on the value of the firm (Price Book Value). Rejection this hypothesis shows that a high Board of Commissioner's Size may not necessarily increase the value of the company.
3. Submission of the second hypothesis indicates that the Independent Commissioner influences the firm's value (Price Book Value). Acceptance this hypothesis shows that the presence of Independent Commissioners affects the value of the company.
4. Submission of the third hypothesis indicates that the Audit Committee influences the value of the firm (Price Book Value). Acceptance this hypothesis shows that the Audit Committee's independence affects the value of the company.

5.2 Limitations of Research

1. The number of samples to be the object of research is still too little, so the picture of the results of this study does not present the general situation that occurred in the Jakarta Islamic Index.
2. In addition, this study does not pay attention to external factors that influence the value of companies such as political issues, investor behavior, market sentiment and others.
3. This study only uses Price Book Value (PBV) to measure the value of the company. While many other components that can be used in measuring the value of the company, for example, Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), Net Profit Margin (NPM).

5.3 Suggestions

The suggestions given by the author based on the results of the analysis used are:

1. In this study the sample used only from companies listed in the Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), in subsequent research selection of the sample used should be expanded
2. In subsequent research replace the other independent variables that are suspected to have a significant influence on the value of the company.
3. Future researchers can use other financial ratios to measure company value.

REFERENCES

[1] Adestian, Yuda, “Pengaruh Dewan Komisaris, Dewan Direksi, Dewan Komisaris Independen, Komite Audit dan Ukuran Perusahaan pada Kinerja Perusahaan Perbankan yang Listing di BEI pada Tahun 2012-2014”, Jurnal Universitas Dian Nuswantoro, Semarang. 2015. (Jurnal)

[2] Andri Rachmawati dan Hanung Triatmoko, “Analisis Faktor-Faktor yang Mempengaruhi Kualitas Laba dan Nilai Perusahaan”, *Simposium Nasional Akuntansi X Makassar, 26-28 Juli*, 2007. (Jurnal)

[3] Anggraini, Dina, “Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan Pada Perusahaan Textile, Garment yang Terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) Periode 2009-2012”, e-Journal Accounting Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji, Tanjung Pinang. Vol.2, No. 2, 2012. (Jurnal)

[4] Beasley, M., “An Empirical Analysis Of The Relation Between The Board Of Director Composition And Financial Statement Fraud”, The Accounting Review. Vol. 71. Pp.443-465, 1996 (Jurnal)

[5] Daily, C.M., & Dalton, D.R., “Corporate Governance and The Bankrupt Firm: An Empirical Assessment”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15 No. 6, pp. 643-56, 1994. (Jurnal)

[6] Effendi, M.A, “The Power of Good Corporate Governance” Teori dan Implementasi”, Salemba Empat, 2008. (Buku)

[7] Fama, Eugene F, “The Effects of a Firm’s Investment and Financing Decisions on the Welfare of Its Security Holders”, The American Economic Review. 272-284, 1978. (Jurnal)

[8] Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia, Seri Tata Kelola (*Corporate Governance*) Jilid II. http://fcgi.org.id, 2001. (Sumber Internet)

[9] Ghozali, Imam. “Aplikasi Analisis Multivariate dengan Program SPSS“. Semarang: UNDIP.

[10] Hamdani, “Good Corporate Governance Tinjauan Etika dalam Praktik Bisnis”, Mitra Wacana Media; Jakarta, 2016. (Buku)

[11] Hartono, Daniel F., & Nugrahanti, Yeterina W. “Pengaruh Mekanisme Corporate Governance Kinerja Keuangan Perusahaan Perbankan”, *Dinamika Akuntansi, Keuangan dan Perbankan*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2014. (Jurnal)

[12] Hendri, Ma’ruf, “*Pemasaran Ritel”*, PT. Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2006. (Buku)

[13] Jensen, M. C and Meckling, W.H, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics, Oktober, 1976, V. 3, No. 4, pp. 305-360, Avalaible from:http://papers.ssrn.com (Sumber Internet)
[14] Kusumawati, Dwi Novi dan Bambang Riyanto LS, "Corporate Governanve dan Kinerja: Analisi Compliance Reporting dan Struktur Dewan Terhadap Kinerja", Simposium Nasional Akuntansi (SNA) VIII Solo, 2005. (Prosiding Konferen)
[15] Lorsch, J.W. & E. Maclver, "*pawns or potentates: The Reality of America's Corporate Boards".* Boston; Harvard Business School Press, 1989. (Buku)
[16] Muryati, N.N.T.S., dan Suardhika, I.M.S., "*Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance pada Nilai Perusahaan",* Jurnal Akuntansi Universitas Udayana, 2014. (Jurnal)
[17] Nuryanah, Siti, "Analisis Hubungan *Board Governance* dengan penciptaaan Nilai Perusahaan: Studi Kasus Perusahaan tercatat di BEJ", Universitas Indonesia, Depok, 2004.
[18] OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 1999. (Buku)
[19] Purwaningtyas dan Irene Rini Demi, "Analisis Pengaruh Mekanisme Good Corporate Governance Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan (Studi Empiris Pada Perusahaan Manufaktur yang Terdaftar di BEI Tahun 2007-2009)", Jurnal Akuntansi Universitas Diponegoro, Semarang, 2011. (Jurnal)
[20] Rismawati, Yusuf Q, dan Rezeki Asriani, "*Pengaruh Internal Audit Terhadap Penerapan Good Corporate Governance pada PT. FIF Cabang Palopo",* Jurnal Akuntansi Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi Muhammadiyah Palopo. Vol 02, No 01. Hal 32-37, 2015. (Jurnal)
[21] Siallagan, Hamonangandan M. Machfoedz, "Mekanisme *Corporate Governance*, Kualitas Laba dan Nilai Perusahaan", Simposium Nasional Akuntansi (SNA) IX . Padang, 2006. (Prosiding Konferen)
[22] Suranta, Eddy dan Mas'ud Machfoedz, "Analisis Struktur kepemilikan, Nilai Perusahaan, Investasi dan Ukuran Dewan Direksi", Simposium Nasional Akuntansi VI. Surabaya, 2003. (Jurnal)
[23] Surya, Indradan Ivan Yustia vandana, "Penerapan *Good Corporate Governance* (Mengesampingkan Hak-hak Istimewa demi Kelangsungan Usaha", LKPMK. Jakarta, 2006.
[24] Syakhroza, Ahmad, "Model Komisaris untuk Efektifitas Good Corporate Governance di Indonesia. Usahawan. No.65, 2004.
[25] Ujiyanto, Muh Arief, dan Bambang Agus Pramuka, "*Mekanisme Corporate Governance, Manajemen Laba dan Kinerja Keuangan*", SNA 8,kakpm-01, Unhas Makassar, 2007. (Prosifing Konferen)
[26] Wahyudi, Johan, "Pengaruh Pengungkapan *Good Corporate Governance,* Ukuran Dewan Komisaris dan Tingkat *Cross-Directorship* Dewan Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan", Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Diponegoro, Semarang, 2010. (Skripsi)
[27] Weston, J. Fred & Eugeence F. Bringham, "*Modern Portofolio",* The Dryden Pass. New York, *11 edition*, 1996. (Buku)
[28] Zarefar, A, "Pengaruh *Good Corporate Governance* Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan Pada Perusahaan LQ-45 DI Bursa Efek Indonesia", Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Riau, 2009. (Skripsi).